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1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had allocated to Main Committee II consideration of the review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, and specifically the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones under article III and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs; articles I and II and the first, second and third preambular paragraphs in their relationship to articles III and IV; and article VII. The Committee would also consider other provisions of the Treaty, the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty. He proposed that the Committee should begin its work with a general exchange of views in order to give delegations an opportunity to express their positions on the operation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty and then proceed to its consideration of the operation of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones and of the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament, including measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty. Finally, the Committee would submit its finalized report to the Conference.

2. A major task of the Committee was to review the implementation of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Previous Treaty review conferences had highlighted the key role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The process of strengthening IAEA safeguards and improving their efficiency was continuing. In that regard, IAEA had demonstrated its readiness to share with the Committee its experience related to "Programme 93 + 2" and to discuss current efforts to strengthen the safeguards system.

3. Finally, he recalled that at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, Main Committee II had reached consensus on almost all the topics it had discussed. He believed that the agreed language reflected in the report of Main Committee II to the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/45/II) should serve as a basis for discussion on which the Committee could elaborate in the light of developments of the past five years.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

4. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said his delegation had noted with satisfaction that, on the whole, safeguards had delivered the benefits envisaged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Safeguards were the practical manifestation of a State's commitment under the Treaty not to acquire

nuclear weapons. They enhanced security on a global and regional scale, provided a framework for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and maintained a necessary environment of confidence in which the process of nuclear disarmament could develop. It was in the interest of all States parties to the Treaty that those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty should do so, and that all parties rapidly conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements.

5. Since the Fourth Review Conference two States parties had been found to be in non-compliance with their obligations under their NPT safeguards agreements and consequently under the Treaty. The experience with Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had confirmed the urgent need to strengthen safeguards, not only in order to keep up with developments in technology, but also to improve detection of undeclared nuclear activities. The Security Council had been directly involved in both cases of non-compliance and States parties to the Treaty should emphasize its vital role in enforcing compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and obligations.

6. The Committee should review the implementation and effectiveness of safeguards and make clear recommendations for their future operations. It should support measures to ensure the early provision to IAEA of design information on nuclear facilities and the introduction of the universal reporting scheme. The Committee should support the access by IAEA to broader information and reaffirm the Agency's right to undertake special inspections. The value of those measures had been clearly demonstrated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea where IAEA had been able to detect evidence of possible undeclared activity. Furthermore, he urged the Conference to call on those States parties who had not yet concluded their safeguards agreements to remedy that situation.

7. His delegation believed a new standard of cooperation with IAEA in safeguards implementation was needed and strongly endorsed the new measures proposed by the IAEA as part of its "Programme 93 + 2" to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. Under "Programme 93 + 2" comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for IAEA verification of the correctness and completeness of declarations by States to provide credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and the absence of undeclared activities. Under comprehensive safeguards, States parties and IAEA had an obligation to cooperate fully to facilitate implementation of the agreements. "Programme 93 + 2" emphasized that a strengthened safeguards system would benefit from technological developments and called for greater access to relevant sites and information. As new measures were implemented and more facilities were placed under safeguards, the budget and resources of IAEA would continue to be stretched. In that regard, the Conference should wholeheartedly support all efforts aimed at improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards, as well as current measures to facilitate safeguards implementation and ensure that the safeguards programme was adequately funded.

8. The Conference should acknowledge that increased nuclear transparency and improved cooperation for safeguarding activities required providing greater information and facilitation in areas such as the designation of inspectors,

multiple entry visas and independent communications for inspectors. The Conference should endorse basic principles on nuclear supply and enhance the role of national export and import control mechanisms to ensure that supplier countries complied with their obligations under articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. In addition, States parties should be encouraged to consider further ways to improve measures to stem nuclear proliferation without impeding their legitimate right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

9. The Conference should strongly urge nuclear weapon States which had not yet done so to place excess fissile material and nuclear installations transferred from military to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. It should call for the highest standards for the physical protection of nuclear material, especially when it was used for military purposes and should welcome the work undertaken by IAEA to respond to reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, while recognizing that States parties needed to strengthen international cooperation and physical protection. The States concerned should be encouraged not to stockpile uranium and plutonium in excess of normal civilian operational requirements.

10. With regard to the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones under article VII of the Treaty, his delegation welcomed the upcoming entry into force of an African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty. He commended the important recent steps taken by Brazil and Cuba which had helped to bring closer the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and urged those countries to support non-proliferation not only regionally, but globally by adhering to the Treaty. His delegation strongly supported the agreed framework which had emerged from negotiations between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, providing a basis for a thorough resolution of the nuclear issue involving the latter country and for the implementation of an agreement between the two Korean States for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, he looked forward to the earliest possible discussions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in the South East Asian regions.

11. Mr. MACKINNON (Canada) said that IAEA safeguards not only ensured that States were complying with their commitments under articles I and II of the Treaty but also enabled States to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as envisaged under article IV, in an atmosphere of confidence. In the long term, such safeguards were also a key to the eventual implementation of article VI.

12. IAEA safeguards had been put in place to detect the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that regard, the Conference should note with regret that two States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had been found to be in non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty or their safeguards agreements with IAEA. While in one case non-compliance had been detected by safeguards, the international community had been alarmed that, in the other case, routine safeguards activities had not detected violations of the Treaty and the safeguards obligations.

13. Efforts must be made to strengthen the safeguards system. An important step had been taken in that direction in March 1995 at the meeting of the IAEA

Board of Governors, which had reiterated that the purpose of comprehensive safeguards agreements was to verify that nuclear material in all nuclear activities was not diverted to nuclear weapons. The Board had noted that the safeguards system should be designed to provide for verification of the correctness and completeness of States' declarations so that there was credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and related activities. In order to achieve that broad purpose, increased rights of access to information and to both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities would be required.

14. Increased access to nuclear facilities could be provided in a manner compatible with the need for the efficient operation of facilities and could lead to more cost-effective safeguards. Moreover, an enhanced and more comprehensive declaration was critical to the Agency's ability to fulfil its responsibilities and should not be an onerous or expensive development.

15. With the number of accessions to the Treaty and, consequently, to its safeguards system since 1990, the international community had drawn significantly closer to the universal application of IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, his delegation was concerned that a significant number of States remained outside the NPT system and that many States parties to the Treaty had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA.

16. The importance of recent unilateral offers to place excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. His delegation urged all nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear facilities that might be transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities by submitting them to IAEA safeguards. There should also be greater transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Such material should not be stockpiled by any State in excess of normal civilian operational requirements.

17. States capable of supplying items that could be used for nuclear proliferation had an obligation to ensure that their nuclear exports were consistent with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. Export controls enabled States to fulfil such obligations. National and multilateral measures in that regard were an essential element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 1976, Canada had adopted a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and it hoped that the Conference would endorse that principle, as had the 1990 Review Conference. His delegation would be pleased to join as a co-sponsor of a proposal on the subject.

18. It was a misconception that export controls inhibited trade or that they were based on an assumption of denial. On the contrary, they were based on the assumption that nuclear cooperation was desirable as long as it did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such controls were not roadblocks but confidence-building measures that fostered cooperation. The multilateral nature of export controls ensured that nuclear non-proliferation concerns did not become an element of commercial competition. With nuclear cooperation and trade with over 30 States parties to the Treaty in all regions of the world, Canada, the world's largest exporter of

uranium and a major nuclear supplier, had found that such requirements had by no means hampered its cooperation.

19. Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany) said that, in the 25-year history of the non-proliferation Treaty, IAEA safeguards had been the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Germany was a large-scale user of nuclear energy and had decades of experience with the application of international safeguards. Such safeguards had enabled Germany to provide assurances about its compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Germany's experiences extended to the synergy of the global IAEA safeguard system with the regional safeguards activities of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and it welcomed the recent partnership agreement between IAEA and EURATOM.

20. The IAEA safeguards system had worked well and proven its flexibility and adaptability over time. Initially, there had been only limited experience with safeguarding sensitive facilities such as enrichment or reprocessing plants. In collaboration with certain of its members, including Germany, IAEA had developed credible safeguards approaches for those facilities.

21. With the revelation of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons programme, it had become clear that the Agency had to improve its capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Germany had endorsed the steps taken by the IAEA secretariat and had co-sponsored and supported the decisions of the Board of Governors to that effect. As the case of non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had demonstrated, the right of the Agency to conduct special inspections had not yet been accepted by all States parties to the Treaty. His delegation supported all steps to ensure the full implementation of that right as soon as possible.

22. His delegation fully supported current efforts to improve the Agency's instruments for detecting undeclared nuclear plants and materials and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of its safeguards approach. Germany welcomed the Agency's research and development efforts and had oriented its national safeguards support programme towards the same objectives. As enhanced transparency offered by non-nuclear-weapon States better enabled the Agency to achieve that goal, a reduction in the routine safeguards effort should be considered.

23. While considerable efforts were being made to improve the safeguards system applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the international community should also take steps to universalize that system. His delegation strongly supported the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition for all new nuclear supply contracts and it applied that principle in its own trade policy. His delegation called upon all nuclear supplier States that had not yet done so to incorporate the condition of full-scope safeguards into their own supply policies.

24. The principle of the universal application of IAEA safeguards should be indivisible. Recent concerns about accounting for nuclear material in nuclear-weapon States pointed to the general utility of safeguards for all peaceful activities in both non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-States. His delegation called upon all nuclear-weapon States to submit their peaceful

nuclear activities to the safeguards standards that were applied to non-nuclear-weapon States under the provisions of the Treaty.

25. Mr. ANDREW (United Kingdom) said that the IAEA safeguards system had performed well over the years, and the application of safeguards had been fair and even-handed. One serious development over the past five years had been the bad faith of some States parties. Current events in Iraq had clearly demonstrated that it was not enough simply to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. The Agency had recognized that fact and had presented an important set of proposals designed to strengthen the safeguards system by improving its ability to detect undeclared activities. His delegation had been encouraged by the positive response of the Agency's Board of Governors to those proposals and looked forward to early agreement on their implementation. His delegation also welcomed the efficiency improvements already made by IAEA, as well as those proposed as part of "Programme 93 + 2".

26. Neither the export controls applied responsibly by States parties in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty nor the Agency's safeguards implementation had hampered the economic or technological development of non-nuclear-weapon States. The successful and wide-ranging nuclear programmes of many States were evidence of the fact.

27. His delegation urged all States parties that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force their safeguards agreements with IAEA.

28. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, as a State party to the non-proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation considered the IAEA safeguards system, to be an effective instrument that increased confidence in the observance of the Treaty and the detection of unauthorized activities. The safeguards system was an additional means of strengthening security, especially at the regional level.

29. In keeping with its obligations under article III of the Treaty, the Russian Federation had continued to provide nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes only to those non-nuclear-weapon States that agreed to the application of IAEA safeguards. Together with other nuclear supplier States, the Russian Federation was taking part in efforts to refine and update the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export was subject to the application of IAEA safeguards, and it adhered strictly to that list in its export policy.

30. All nuclear supplier States should observe the principle of full-scope safeguards. In 1992, the Russian Federation had introduced a new system of export controls that required export and import licences for dual-purpose items that could be used to build a nuclear explosive device.

31. The Russian Federation was participating actively in the further development of the concept of special inspections, including the inspection of undeclared facilities. At the same time, the Agency's efforts to apply the safeguards should not hinder scientific and technological progress or international cooperation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such efforts should be based on the optimum use of the Agency's human and material resources.

32. In accordance with the safeguards agreement concluded between IAEA and the Soviet Union on 10 June 1985, the Russian Federation had cooperated with the Agency and had allowed it to inspect its peaceful nuclear facilities. The Russian Federation had also provided the Agency with highly qualified specialists who had taken part in inspection activities in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in the assessment of South Africa's former nuclear weapons programme. Experts from the Russian Federation had also taken part in the work of the advisory groups on the assessment of the effectiveness of safeguards and the elaboration of effective ways of improving the technical means of verification.

33. The Russian Federation had continued to contribute to the technical development of safeguards through its national programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA safeguards. Between 1990 and 1995, leading research institutes and organizations in the Russian Federation had taken part in the programme, and in 1994 alone more than 500 million roubles had been spent on activities under the programme. Research institutes in the Russian Federation assisted the Agency in carrying out analyses of used fuel samples taken by IAEA specialists during inspections and of samples from the environment taken to monitor undeclared activities in the reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear material. As part of its national programme, the Russian Federation had developed a small-scale spectrometric detector that had been widely used by the Agency in the monitoring of spent fuel.

34. The Russian Federation held annual international training courses for IAEA inspectors: beginning inspectors were trained at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant and experienced inspectors at new nuclear facilities that had been placed under IAEA safeguards. In addition, Russian scientific institutes had held courses for the staff of national systems on methods of taking inventory of and monitoring nuclear material.

35. The Russian Federation was participating in "Programme 93 + 2" to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. Studies were being conducted on the ways to monitor the environment with a view to detecting signs of the undeclared construction and testing of nuclear explosive devices. Efforts were being made to establish indicators of nuclear weapons activities, develop methods for selecting and analysing samples of the environment and assess the effectiveness of the application of that method in international safeguards.

36. The Russian Federation was in favour of broadening international cooperation to prevent illegal trafficking in nuclear materials. All sovereign States that possessed nuclear materials had the obligation to guarantee their non-proliferation, physical protection, security and safekeeping, and they would also be held responsible in the event that such materials disappeared, were stolen or illegally moved. States should also help the Agency make use of its great potential to improve the level of physical protection and develop monitoring and inventory systems. Bilateral cooperation between law-enforcement agencies was of particular importance. The Russian Federation had signed a bilateral agreement with Germany on cooperation to prevent illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, and it intended to expand its cooperation in that area with other countries and organizations.

37. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said IAEA safeguards were an effective means of demonstrating the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. The nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States that had not concluded full-scope safeguards agreements represented a serious risk of nuclear proliferation. His delegation urged all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and conclude such agreements. It also urged States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so to conclude the required safeguards agreements.

38. While the IAEA safeguards system had performed well over the past five years, there was a clear need to enhance the safeguards. His delegation commended the Agency's work in uncovering violations of safeguards agreements in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Conference should take note of the Agency's efforts and recognize the important role of the Security Council in addressing cases of non-compliance with the Treaty.

39. The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme made it clear that IAEA safeguards needed to be strengthened. Relevant actions began at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1992, at which the Board had reaffirmed the Agency's right to conduct special inspections and require the early provision by States of information about their nuclear facilities. In February 1993, the Board had endorsed the reporting scheme for additional information on imports and exports. His delegation urged all States to provide the Agency with relevant information that would assist the Agency in fulfilling its responsibilities. At the same time, the Agency must carefully assess all such information.

40. Additional measures needed to be assessed and implemented to further strengthen IAEA safeguards. The Agency had responded by initiating its "Programme 93 + 2". The Conference provided the States parties to the Treaty with an opportunity to give substantial support to "Programme 93 + 2" as a means of fundamentally strengthening the verification of States parties' obligations under the Treaty. In particular, the Conference should express its conviction that the application of IAEA safeguards under NPT safeguards agreements must include the regular application of measures that provided credible assurance that there were no undeclared activities.

41. The Conference should express its strong support for adequate funding for IAEA safeguards and should urge the Agency, in particular its member States, to adopt arrangements that would ensure the long-term funding of IAEA safeguards at a level sufficient to maintain its important contribution to international security.

42. Since the early 1970s, the States parties to the Treaty had been meeting on a regular basis to ensure that the export of nuclear material and certain equipment was subject to IAEA safeguards. His delegation believed that the work of the Zangger Committee had been essential in giving effect to States parties' commitments under articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and should be continued. The work of the Zangger Committee, as well as the Nuclear Supplier Group, was open and transparent, and their guidelines were published by IAEA and available to all interested parties. His delegation urged all States parties to the Treaty to adopt the guidelines of the Zangger Committee.

43. The 1990 Review Conference had reached agreement on a number of important principles regarding export controls, including the need for all parties to take steps to ensure that their exports did not assist nuclear-weapon programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States, the need to ensure that preference in nuclear cooperation was provided to States parties to the Treaty, the need to coordinate the control of items not identified in article III, paragraph 2, that could assist nuclear-weapons programmes, and the need for full-scope safeguards as a condition of future supply. Those principles were just as valid in 1995 as they had been five years ago, and his delegation urged the Committee to adopt them again.

44. His delegation supported nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, South-East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. Such zones could be an important complement to the global undertakings contained in the Treaty, and the Conference should recognize the many positive developments since 1990 relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

45. Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland) said that, on the question of safeguards, article III of the Treaty was clear and unambiguous. The Treaty was also clear with regard to the time-frames involved. However, dozens of States parties to the Treaty had not agreed to comprehensive safeguards agreements of the type referred to in INFCIRC/153 of IAEA, and that situation was clearly unacceptable. In a diplomatic effort prior to the Conference, Finland and other Nordic States had approached States parties to the Treaty which had not concluded safeguards agreements. On a national basis, Finland had also participated as a donor country in organizing safeguards support programmes for the Baltic States and Ukraine. Finland hoped that the Committee would continue to urge countries without safeguards agreements to live up to the non-proliferation commitment.

46. With regard to "Programme 93 + 2" of IAEA, the combined experience of non-compliance in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown that the original safeguards concepts of IAEA was inadequate. Nevertheless, Finland strongly supported "Programme 93 + 2" and hoped that the Conference would endorse all the measures provided for in it.

47. Finland had accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities and was prepared to embark on the legislative measures deemed necessary to implement the extended access facilities proposed in "Programme 93 + 2".

48. Regarding the question of trade-off, he noted that IAEA had proposed fundamental changes to the current safeguards system. The new approach, namely to target undeclared activities and sites, was absolutely necessary. Such an approach would also necessitate a new set of legal instruments to clarify the rights of the Agency and its inspectors in performing their duties. Finland believed that any new instrument should eventually involve an incentive or trade-off. Such a trade-off would mean that countries acceding to or adopting a new and more intrusive IAEA safeguards instrument should and could be subject to fewer routine inspections. Finland hoped that the Committee would support such an approach; it also hoped that the Conference would endorse a time-frame for the implementation of the main provisions of "Programme 93 + 2" so that the momentum of the process could be maintained.

49. On the topic of nuclear technology transfers, he said that Finland required the acceptance of full-scope safeguards from any non-nuclear weapons recipient and government-to-government guarantees on non-retransfer from any recipient of nuclear transfer originating in Finland. The Conference should urge those few suppliers who still did not require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to introduce such requirements without delay.

50. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) reminded the Committee that article III of the Treaty obliged States parties without nuclear weapons to submit all of their nuclear installations and nuclear material for IAEA inspection. Since the discovery of Iraq's secret nuclear programme, the international community had recognized that the non-proliferation Treaty could only be credible if it stipulated really effective inspection measures. The human and financial resources of the Agency should therefore be more effectively targeted to detect not only the diversion of declared nuclear materials but also clandestine nuclear activities. Belgium supported the proposed reforms of the inspection system that would give inspectors greater access to nuclear sites and allow the Agency to pursue a more selective approach in its inspections.

51. Like its European partners, Belgium had already put in place measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system, such as rapid transmission of information about new facilities and the declaration of imports and exports of nuclear weapons and certain types of equipment.

52. It was clear that illegal trafficking in nuclear materials originating in former communist countries posed a grave proliferation risk. In addition, it was easier to gain access to the sensitive technologies which made it possible to build nuclear weapons. Inventories of nuclear materials and physical protection measures needed to be strengthened, and the international community and IAEA could make a valuable contribution by helping national authorities to establish such mechanisms. Effective monitoring was also a precondition of the development of trade and technology transfer. Without the credible guarantee that supplied material would not be diverted to military or terrorist uses, all such technology transfers would be risky. Therefore the general guarantees provided by the Treaty were a foundation of rather than an obstacle to the sustained development of trade between States parties to the Treaty.

53. In addition to strengthening the safeguards system, Belgium favoured universal monitoring. Therefore it supported the extension of such monitoring of fissionable material arising from the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and civilian nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapons States. Belgium welcomed the fact that Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton had announced that any fissionable material deriving from the dismantling process should be monitored by IAEA.

54. On the topic of regional control systems, he reminded the Committee that Euratom monitored all civilian nuclear activities of States members of the European Union, regardless of whether they were nuclear-weapons States or not. EURATOM and IAEA had inaugurated a particularly fruitful partnership and made it possible to achieve savings in the latter monitoring activities. More generally, IAEA could delegate certain monitoring activities to regional bodies provided that such bodies possessed a respectable technical record and adequate institutional credibility.

55. Belgium supported international nuclear cooperation and welcomed any measure designed to achieve that end without risk of proliferation. The commitment of as many supplier States as possible to equitable and universally applicable rules governing the transfer of nuclear material and equipment would be a major step forward. Comprehensive safeguards should be a precondition of all nuclear-related exports.

56. Mr. ITALIANI (Italy) said that there seemed to be a consensus that the safeguards provided for in INFCIRC/153 were no longer appropriate or efficient and needed to be adapted, though such a task would be arduous and take a very long time. In the meantime "Programme 93 + 2" should be approved, which would effectively remedy the problem without having to resort to wholesale revision of INFCIRC/153. In addition, the Committee should support the attempts being made by IAEA to strengthen the NPT safeguards system.

57. The increased incidence of nuclear trafficking obviously indicated the inadequate nature of physical protection in many States. However, there was little IAEA could do about that problem without the cooperation of the States concerned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.